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ABSTRACT 
 
This article studies the contrast between civil and common law 
systems regarding the significance of the notarial act. According to 
conventional scholarship, in the former, civil procedure requires 
written evidence and the notarial act is the strongest kind of evi-
dence. In the latter, however, civil procedure requires oral evidence 
and the notarial act has no specific relevance. This article examines 
the extent of these two main principles: a) in civil law systems the 
notarial act is full evidence of the extrinsic and a document can be 
challenged only with an action for falsity; and b) in common law 
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systems the notarial act has no specific evidentiary effect. Examina-
tion of the operational rules of both systems shows a marked weak-
ening of the traditional theoretical opposition due to an increasingly 
pragmatic approach in solving problems linked to notarial acts, 
which are nowadays the same everywhere. This change marks an 
inexorable abandon of the crystallization of the classical schemes 
and theories, which, over the past centuries, have considered com-
mon law solutions a separate world from the civil law legal tradi-
tion.    
 
Keywords: notarial act, public document, act under seal, deed, ves-
timentum, ius commune, contrelettres, témoins passent lettres, ex-
trinsic, intrinsic 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some of the strongest and most common oppositions in compar-
ative law are centered on the notarial act. The notary is a public of-
ficial in civil law systems who produces public or authentic docu-
ments with a high evidentiary value in the civil process, where writ-
ten proof prevails.1 In contrast, common law systems have neither 
this type of notary, nor these public documents, and the proof pro-
vided in courts is predominately oral.  
Often, the easiest and most successful oppositions, clear and lin-
ear in their approach, do not correspond with the facts. In the English 
system, there have been two new events, over the last few decades, 
that have modified the usual representation of these arguments.  
First, judges of European common law systems are now called 
to accept any authentic document (notarial acts and court decisions) 
that originates from another European Union member state.2 In the 
English system, the relevant rules can be found in parts 74A and 
                                                                                                             
 1. For relevant comparative law literature, see L. N. Brown, The Office of 
the Notary in France, 2 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 60 (1953); D. B. Burke, Jr. & J. K. Fox, 
The Notaire in North America: A Short Study of the Adaptation of a Civil Law 
Institution, 50 TUL. L. REV. 318 (1976).  
 2. See Brussels Convention of May 25, 1987; Lugano Convention of Sep-
tember 16, 1988. 
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74B of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). Second, English judges 
have the capacity to receive a notarial act “in evidence without fur-
ther proof.”3 
It is thus an opportune time to revisit the nature of the notarial 
act in the civil law systems and its peculiar strength as proof, com-
paring it with its counterpart under common law. This approach re-
quires us to ascertain the typical evidentiary value of the notarial act 
among the various types of written evidence admitted in the civil 
procedure.4 
II. NOTARIAL ACTS AND DEEDS: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
In Romano-Germanic civil procedure, written proof is found pri-
marily in public documents and private agreements. The public doc-
ument is characterised by the intervention of a public official such 
as a notary during drafting.  
Pothier’s definition of a public document is still used: “Authen-
tic acts are those which are received by a public officer, with the 
requisite solemnities.”5 This definition appears in article 1317 of the 
French Civil Code: “An authentic act is one that has been received 
by public legal officers who have the authority to draw up such acts 
at the place where the act was written and with the requisite formal-
ities.”6  
Through the French Civil Code, Pothier’s definition reached 
Belgium (article 1317 of the Code Civil, identical to the French), 
                                                                                                             
 3. Civil Procedure Rules 2005, 32.20 (CPR 2005).  
 4. For a general overview of the written evidence in civil procedure, see 
DIMENSIONS OF EVIDENCE IN EUROPEAN CIVIL PROCEDURE (V. Rijavec, T. Ivanc 
& T. Kerestes eds., Wolters Kluwer 2016).  
 5. R. J. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, OR CONTRACTS 
516 (W. D. Evans trans. 1853) [hereinafter OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS]; R. J. 
Pothier, Traité des obligations, in OEUVRES DE POTHIER 367 (J.-J. Bugnet ed., 
Videcoq père et fils 1846): “Les actes authentiques sont ceux qui sont reçus par 
un Officier public, avec les solemnités requises.” [hereinafter Traité des obliga-
tions]. 
 6. The relevant French text (and English translation) can be found on the 
Legifrance website: “L'acte authentique est celui qui a été reçu par officiers pu-
blics ayant le droit d'instrumenter dans le lieu où l'acte a été rédigé, et avec les 
solemnités requises,” https://perma.cc/FLA4-U6GT. 
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Québec (article 2813 of the Civil Code of Quebec: “An authentic act 
is one that has been received or attested by a competent public of-
ficer in accordance with the laws of Québec or of Canada, with the 
formalities required by law.”), Italy (article 1315 and article 2699 of 
the Codice civile from 1865), and Louisiana (article 2234 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 18707: “The authentic act, as relates to con-
tracts, is that which has been executed before a notary public or other 
officer authorised to execute such functions . . . .”). 
The German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozeßordnung or 
ZPO) is similar. Under §415, public documents (öffentlicher Ur-
kunden) are defined as: “Documents that have been prepared, in ac-
cordance with the requirements as to form, by a public authority 
within the scope of its official responsibilities, or by a person vested 
with public trust within the sphere of business assigned to him.” 
A document similar to the acte notarié of continental systems 
also exists in English law. In England, legislation regarding public 
notaries indeed cites “notarial acts,”8 but it does not define them, 
specifying only that the tasks of public notaries, among others, are 
to “perform or certify any notarial act.”9 A famous scholar defined 
the notarial act as “any written instrument, act, or ceremony, under 
the signature and seal of a notary, authenticating or certifying some 
document, deed, writing, occurrence or fact.”10 
However, the most solemn document in the English system, sub-
stantively equivalent to the continental public document, is not the 
notarial act, but rather, the simple act under seal (deed). The deed, 
until a few years ago, was defined as a solemn document, written, 
                                                                                                             
 7. Repealed by Acts 1984, No. 331, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1985, replaced by art. 
1833. 
 8. The historical layering of works from English notaries appears in the def-
inition contained in the Legal Services Act 2007, schedule 2: “‘Notarial activities’ 
means activities which … were customarily carried on by virtue of enrolment as 
a notary in accordance with section 1 of the Public Notaries Act 1801 (c. 79).”  
 9. Public Notaries Act 1833, s. 3-4. 
 10. R. BROOKE, A TREATISE OF THE OFFICE AND PRACTICE OF A NOTARY OF 
ENGLAND 190 (Saunders & Benning 1839). On “notarial seal, which gives effect 
to them” is affixed, see King v. Scriveners’ Co. 1830 10 B. & C. 511; 109 E.R. 
540, 544. 
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sealed, and delivered by the author.11 The requirement of the seal 
had been long substituted with a circular mark, pre-printed on the 
sheet, containing the letters L.S. (locus sigilli).12 The Law of Prop-
erty Act definitively abolished this requirement.13 On the other 
hand, this law provided that it must be “clear on its face that it is 
intended to be a deed,”14 that the deed must be undersigned in the 
presence of a witness,15 and that it must be delivered by the author 
or the professional who oversaw its preparation.16  
The formality of the deed constitutes the most solemn form of 
documentation known under the English legal system. Indeed, it is 
not only necessary for the transfer of legal estates on land, but also 
for the assumption of obligations without consideration.17 The func-
tion of vestimentum for the transfer of a right or the assumption of 
an obligation without consideration is carried out in a deed. Put dif-
ferently, the presence of a consideration or the formality of the deed 
are the legal requirements necessary in common law to justify the 
transfer of a right or the enforceability of a promise: if a considera-
tion is lacking, the deed supports the transfer or the promise. It has 
the same effect as a continental notarial act. In common law systems, 
a notarial act, which does not require the conditions imposed by a 
deed, cannot transfer a legal estate, nor can it compensate for the 
absence of consideration.  
It is thus misleading to compare, at the level of substantive law, 
the public document of the Romano-Germanic systems with the 
English notarial act. For this reason, international private law schol-
ars usually equate the continental public document with the deed in 
                                                                                                             
 11. See R. MEGARRY & H.W.R. WADE, ,THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 156 et 
seq. (5th ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1989); G.C. CHESHIRE & E.H. BURN, MODERN 
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 734 et seq. (14th ed., Oxford U. Press 1988). 
 12. This practice was already accepted in First National Securities Ltd v. 
Jones [1978] Ch. 109. 
 13. Law of Property Act, 1989, s. 1(1)(c). 
 14. Id. s. 1(2)(s). 
 15. Id. s. 1(3)(a). 
 16. Id. s. 1(3)(b) and 1(5). 
 17. See H. DE PAGE, L’OBLIGATION ABSTRAITE EN DROIT INTERNE ET 
COMPARÉ 137 et seq. (Bruylant 1957).  
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common law countries. When the law in a continental system im-
poses the solemn form of the public document, such a request is sat-
isfied if the document, created in the common law system, has been 
executed as a deed.18  
III. THE DOCUMENTARY PROOF IN THE CIVIL PROCEDURE: A 
COMPARATIVE EXCURSUS 
In the systems under review, a wealth of comments have been 
made on the evidentiary value of the written document and, in par-
ticular, the notarial act. In common law systems, a general principle 
exists which vests the judge (at times flanked by a jury) with free-
dom of verdict in the evaluation of the evidentiary material pre-
sented during the trial.  
In Romano-Germanic systems, however, written documents 
prevail in civil procedure: the main method of proof is the written 
document. Written proof is said to be civilized, and testimonial 
proof to be barbarian.19 The types of written evidence are varied, but 
the most important are public documents, which allow “legal cer-
tainty” to be determined. Indeed, in the realm of written procedure, 
the presentation of a notarial act in court deprives the judge of his 
power to evaluate the proof. Judges cannot evaluate the document: 
they may only look at the result of the evidence and deduce the ef-
fect as established by the law.20  
                                                                                                             
 18. See Ph. Francescakis, Commentaire d’arrêt n°121/1951, REVUE 
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 372 (1953); G. KEGEL, 
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 369 (5th ed., Beck 1985).  
 19. M.L. LAROMBIÈRE, 5 THÉORIE ET PRATIQUE DES OBLIGATIONS 472 
(1885): “la preuve littérale appartient à la civilisation, et la preuve testimoniale 
à la barbarie.” 
 20. For an interesting historical and comparative analysis, see M. DAMASKA, 
THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO 
THE LEGAL PROCESS (Yale U. Press 1986). A comparative approach to the rules 
on evidence is developed in CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 9 ( O. 
G. Chase & H. Hershkoff eds., West 2007). On the origins of the Roman-Ger-
manic rules on evidence, see also the fundamental study of K.W. NORR, 
ROMANISCH-KANONISCHES PROZESSRECHT ERKENNTNISVERFAHREN ERSTER 
INSTANZ IN CIVILIBUS (Springer 2012); see also J. Sladic & A. Uzelac, Assessment 
of Evidence, in DIMENSIONS OF EVIDENCE IN EUROPEAN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra 
note 4, at 108 et seq.  
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In Germany, the notion of full proof can be found in § 415, 1 of 
the ZPO: public acts “shall establish full proof, provided they have 
been executed regarding a declaration made before the public au-
thority or the public official issuing the deed.” They are assisted by 
the “presumption of truth”21 (Vermutung der Echtheit). The same 
rule is repeated in § 417 and § 418 of the ZPO respectively, relative 
to documents derived from public administration. The fact that the 
document is written and signed by a notary is by itself sufficient to 
grant to the act full evidence, in particular regarding these elements: 
the place and date of their creation, the identity of notary and parties, 
and the actions made by the parties and by the notary (this is called 
the extrinsic).22 However, the full evidence given by notarial acts 
must be interpreted narrowly because it is an exception to the 
judge’s power to evaluate the evidence received during the trial.23 A 
clear example of this rule can be found in a case decided by the Ger-
man Supreme Court in 201624: a house was sold; the notarial act 
stated its area amounted to 640 square meters; the buyer later meas-
ured the area and found it was only 540 square meters. The court 
explained that the full evidence was given to the fact that the seller 
                                                                                                             
 21. § 437 ZPO. 
 22. See H.J. Ahrens, sub § 415 ZPO, in B. WIECZOREK & R. SCHÜTZE, 
ZIVILPROZEßORDNUNG UND NEBENGESETZE 636 et seq. (3d ed., Beck 2010), and 
therein a comprehensive list of documents, which fall under the application of the 
cited paragraphs; C. Berger, sub § 415 ZPO, in F. STEIN & M. JONAS, 
KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZEßORDNUNG 770 et seq. (23d ed., Mohr Siebeck 
2015); L. ROSENBERG, K.H. SCHWABT & P. GOTTWALD, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 673 
(17th ed., Beck 2010). Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 
[Decisions of the Reichsgericht in civil matters] (RGZ) Dec. 16, 1910, 74, 421, at 
424, the public act “ist für den Rechtskundigen ohne weiteres ersichtlich.” See 
also Bundesgerichthof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr.15, 1994 V ZR 
175/92, https://perma.cc/4TDQ-GXL2 (the Supreme Court recognizes the full 
proof to a change handwritten by the notary over the typed text of the notarial 
act). 
 23. See K. Schreiber, sub § 415 ZPO, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUR 
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 208 (4th ed. 2012). 
 24. BGH, Jun. 10, 2016, V ZR 295/14, https://perma.cc/3CYM-X3QU. On 
the same ground in a criminal case for falsity, the German Supreme Court decided 
that a notary is not guilty if a party of the act declares that he or she knows the 
German language, but this is not true: the content of the declaration is not covered 
by full proof. See BGH, May 25, 2001, StR 88/01. 
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declared the (wrong) surface, but that the actual surface could be 
proved by any kind of evidence. 
A similar rule exists in the Netherlands’ Code of Civil Proce-
dure.25 In France and Italy, the day-to-day evidentiary value of the 
public document reflects the history of the action for falsity of doc-
uments that took place during Napoleonic codification. In Roman 
ius commune, as explained by Dumoulin, the public document pro-
vides full proof of the facts contained within for whomever it repre-
sents: “Quoad veritatem et probationem, plenam fidem facit quoad 
omnes; . . . acta vel quaecumque scripta publica probant se ipsa, id 
est rei taliter gestae fidem faciunt inter quoscumque.”26 Differing 
from proof, the effect of the negotiation, as contained in the public 
document, is relevant only to the parties, their heirs, and succes-
sors.27 The Roman ius commune solution is still applied in Scotland, 
where the authentic document “is held to prove the verity of the legal 
actus expressed in it as the genuine actus of its author.”28 Pothier 
intended to follow traditional teachings. He wrote:  
An original authentic act has in itself full credit as to what is 
contained in it . . . . The signature of the officer who has 
received the act, carries full credit of everything which the 
act contains, and of the signature of the parties who have 
subscribed it . . . .29 Authentic acts are entitled to credit, prin-
cipally against the persons who were parties to them, their 
heirs, and those deriving title under them. They have full 
credit against such persons as to all the operative part of the 
act, that is to say, of every thing which the parties had in 
                                                                                                             
 25. C.H. Van Rhee, Evidence in Civil Procedure in the Netherlands: Tradi-
tion and Modernity, in EVIDENCE IN CONTEMPORARY CIVIL PROCEDURE 270 et 
seq. (C.H. Van Rhee & A. Uzelac eds., Cambridge U. Press 2015); see art. 156 et 
seq. Rv (Netherlands’ Code of Civil Procedure).  
 26. C. DUMOULIN, COMMENTAIRES SUR LA COUTUME DE PARIS nn. 8, 10 
(1539; revised ed. 1665), reprinted in C.B.M. TOULLIER, 3 LE DROIT CIVIL 
FRANÇAIS 278 (1847). 
 27. Id.  
 28. See also D.M. WALKER, PRINCIPLES OF SCOTTISH PRIVATE LAW 94 (Ox-
ford U. Press 1982); a similar formula to Dumoulin’s can be read in A. 
MCDOUALL, 2 AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND IN CIVIL RIGHTS 502 
(1752): notarial acts “are probative by themselves, unless unproven.” 
 29. POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS, supra note 5, at 517; Pothier, 
Traité des obligations, supra note 5, at 368. 
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view, and which constitutes the object of the act . . . .30 The 
act proves against a third person, rem ipsam, that is to say, 
that the transaction which it includes has intervened.31  
In his explanation, Pothier links the evidence given by the public 
document, between the parties and their heirs and successors, to the 
content of it and not only to the historical facts documented by the 
act.32  
The French Notarial Law of 1803 stated that notarial acts shall 
have full credit in court (“feront foi en justice”).33 The Napoleonic 
Code recognizes for the most part the teachings of Pothier and states: 
“An authentic act is absolute proof of the agreement it contains be-
tween the contracting parties and their heirs or assignees.”34 The 
law, on one  hand, seems to attribute probative value only between 
the parties and their heirs and successors, while on the other hand, it 
seems to extend such probative power to the negotiating power of 
that document.  
The French model has been replicated in Louisiana, where arti-
cle 2236 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 states: “The authentic 
                                                                                                             
 30. POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS, supra note 5, at 518; Pothier, 
Traité des obligations, supra note 5, at 369.  
 31. Id.  
 32. On this point, see the discussion of TOULLIER, supra note 26; see also the 
explanation that attempts to rationalize the work of Pothier by F. MOURLON, II 
RÉPÉTITIONS ÉCRITES SUR LE CODE CIVIL 862 (1885).  
 33. Law of March 16, 1803 (loi 25 ventôse an XI), art. 19 para. 1. 
 34. The origins of article 1319 of the Code Napoléon and the interpretation 
given by Pothier of Dumoulin’s text are explained by TOULLIER, supra note 26, 
at 277. The adoption of article 1321 of the Code Napoléon (“Les contre-lettres ne 
peuvent avoir leur effet qu’entre les parties contractantes . . . .”) refers also to 
contracts stipulated under public acts, and excludes the effectiveness of the full 
proof of that act, with respect to the content of other declarations. After the French 
reform of contracts, article 1321 on counterletters has been replaced with article 
1202 of the French Civil Code: 
Est nulle toute contre-lettre ayant pour objet une augmentation du prix 
stipulé dans le traité de cession d'un office ministériel.  
Est également nul tout contrat ayant pour but de dissimuler une partie 
du prix, lorsqu'elle porte sur une vente d'immeubles, une cession de 
fonds de commerce ou de clientèle, une cession d'un droit à un bail, ou 
le bénéfice d'une promesse de bail portant sur tout ou partie d'un im-
meuble et tout ou partie de la soulte d'un échange ou d'un partage com-
prenant des biens immeubles, un fonds de commerce ou une clientèle. 
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act is full proof of the agreement contained in it, against the con-
tracting parties and their heirs or assigns, unless it be declared and 
proved to be a forgery.”35 The same rule appeared in the 1866 Civil 
Code of Lower Canada.36 In Italy, article 1317 of the Civil Code of 
1865 upheld the French model, but distinguished between the intrin-
sic and extrinsic: the notarial act gives full proof of the facts that the 
notary declares have occurred in his presence.  
IV. INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC: A GAZE ON THE DIFFUSION OF THE 
FRENCH AND ITALIAN SOLUTIONS ON THE “FULL PROOF ACT” 
DEBATE 
French and Italian scholars have immediately corrected what is 
provided for under article 1319 of the Code Napoleon and article 
1317 of the Italian Civil Code of 1865. The rule is thus—the public 
document is full proof of the date, identity of the public official, and 
signatories, as well as the actual occurrence of declarations and facts 
as attested in the act (the extrinsic), but not of the truth of the decla-
rations issued by the parties or the judgments issued by the notary 
(the intrinsic).37 This teaching is further addressed in article 2700 of 
the Italian Civil Code of 1942. 
                                                                                                             
 35. See the classical treatise of SAUL LITVINOFF, 6 OBLIGATIONS 202 (West 
1969).  
 36. Article 1310 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, 1866, mirroring that of 
the French Code states the following: 
 L’acte authentique fait preuve complète entre les parties, leurs héritiers 
et représentants légaux: 
 1. De l'obligation qui y est exprimée;  
 2. De tout ce qui y est exprimé en termes énonciatifs, pourvu que l’énon-
ciation ait un rapport direct à telle obligation ou à l’objet qu’avaient en 
vue les parties en passant l’acte . . . .  
Also, article 1311 provides for an action against falsity in a notarial act, regulated 
by the Code of Civil Procedure, as per the French model. See H. KÉLADA, 
NOTIONS ET TECHNIQUES DE PREUVE CIVILE 35 et seq., 53 (Wilson & Lafleur 
1986); M. A. TANCELIN, DES OBLIGATIONS : CONTRAT ET RESPONSABILITÉ 120 et 
seq. (Wilson & Lafleur 1986).  
 37. In theory, for example, the mental health of the testator, ascertained by 
the notary and mentioned in the public will, is not considered covered by the full 
proof of the act and can be fought with simple evidence to the contrary: see 
TOULLIER, supra note 26; See also A. DURANTON, 7 COURS DE DROIT FRANÇAIS 
273 (3d ed. 1834); LAROMBIÈRE, supra note 19, at 518; G. BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE & L. BARDE, III TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL : 
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The same rule is now adopted in the new Quebec Civil Code: 
“The recital, in an authentic act, of the facts which the public officer 
had the task of observing or recording makes proof against all per-
sons.”38 Thus, we find that the same rule has been applied both in 
German law and the French legal tradition.  
French and Italian scholars thought that Pothier did not have 
clear ideas on this subject so they superimposed intrinsic and extrin-
sic notions on legislative texts. In reality, Pothier knew perfectly 
well what he was writing and French legislators intended to follow 
his teachings. Successive French authors placed a new significance 
upon simulation.  
In the French ius commune, contracting parties (and thus their 
heirs and successors), were unable to oppose the evidentiary effect 
of a public document, even in regards to the content of the negotia-
tions. Only matrimony was subject to the appeal of a counter decla-
ration (les contrelettres) which, however, could not be enforced 
against third parties.  
                                                                                                             
DES OBLIGATIONS 420 (2d ed. 1905); T. HUC, 3 COMMENTAIRE THÉORIQUE & 
PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL 281 (Pichon 1895); M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, VII 
TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 886 (2d ed 1954); For Belgium, see 
H. DE PAGE, III TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL BELGE: LES OBLIGATIONS 
(2d ed., E. Bruylant 1950), which refers to following code formula “ne doit pas 
être prise à la lettre.” In the case law, see C.A. Fort-de-France, Nov. 23, 2012, n. 
Rg 117 00072 and C.A. Paris, Oct. 18, 2011, 10/02929 (in these cases judges 
allowed any means to contest the content of the declaration made by the parties); 
see also C.A. Paris, Jun. 24, 2016, 14/19810 (in this case there was an error in the 
description of the immovable sold); For Italy, see E. PACIFICI-MAZZONI, I 
TRATTATO DELLA VENDITA 152 (3d ed.1901); G. GIORGI, I TEORIA DELLE 
OBBLIGAZIONI NEL DIRITTO MODERNO ITALIANO 378 (3d ed. 1890); and for case 
law, see Cass. Turin, Apr. 19, 1866, Giur. it., 1866, 187; Cass. Florence, Jan. 27, 
1870, Legge 1870, I, 281; Cass. Rome, Nov. 22, 1876, Legge 1877, I, 59; Cass. 
Naples, Feb. 9, 1883, Legge 1883, I, 585; Cass. Palermo, Apr. 22, 1894, Legge 
1894, II, 332. As it has already been seen, in Quebec only the French legal model 
was initially adopted. However, the doctrine was quickly brought into line with 
the French: KÉLADA, supra note 36, at 53, speaking of “inexactitude de rédac-
tion,” and J.-C. ROYER, LA PREUVE CIVILE 101 (1987), admitting that “nos codi-
ficateurs ont commis la même erreur rédactionnelle que ceux du Code Napoléon 
. . . . La doctrine française et québécoise a corrigé cette erreur.” Eventually, the 
new Civil Code adopted the rule approved by scholars. 
 38. Art. 2818, Civil Code of Quebec. 
18 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 10 
 
 
 
French legislators, following the teachings of Domat, extended 
this particular rule to any contract, but always under the  law of ev-
idence, and not as a rule on the effects of contracts.39 This springs 
from the old article 1321 of the Code Napoleon: “Counterletters can 
have effect only between the contracting parties; they cannot have 
effect against third parties.” It is worth noting that the new articles 
1200-1202 of the Code civil français (French Civil Code) enacted 
after the recent reform of contract law in 2016, maintain the same 
content. The rule thus allows a declaration that seeks to paralyze the 
preceding document and only affects the law of evidence. In prac-
tice, this means that the parties to a contract may invoke the second 
document with the aim of minimising the evidentiary effect of the 
first.  
Scholars began to bring the problems of the contrelettres under 
the frame of natural law. This likens a contract to the pure will of 
the parties and consequently treats falsity as a divergence between 
will and declaration. Scholars no longer consider this question a 
problem of proof. Counter-declarations thus assume relevance as an 
indication of the difference between will and declaration at the mo-
ment of the creation of the false document.  
In conclusion, current German, Italian, and Quebec legal rules, 
as well as French doctrinal rule, establish that the notarial act is con-
clusive evidence only of the occurrence of the described event (the 
extrinsic).40 The same conclusion is reached in Scotland.41 
                                                                                                             
 39. See J. DOMAT, LES LOIX CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL 213 (1777). 
 40. See G. CHIOVENDA, PRINCIPII DI DIRTTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE: LE AZIONI 
IL PROCESSO DI COGNIZIONE 845 (Jovene 1965). V. ANDRIOLI, II COMMENTARIO 
AL CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, DEL PROCESSO DI COGNIZIONE 154 (1956); O. 
JAUERING, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 200 (21st ed. 1985); Ahrens, supra note 22; 
Berger, supra note 22.  
 41. See J. ERSKINE, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 483 (1827): 
“Notarial instruments . . . bear full evidence that the solemnities therein set forth 
were used . . . do not prove any other extrinsic fact.” See also G. J. BELL, 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 826 (10th ed. 1899): “Notarial instruments 
. . . are good evidence of the act which it is the province of a notary to perform, 
but not of extraneous facts recited in the instrumentum;” 17 THE LAWS OF 
SCOTLAND 477 et seq. (1989).  
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V. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IN COMMON LAW ORAL 
PROCEEDINGS: SOME ENLIGHTENING CASES 
Contrary to the alleged prevalence of written proof in the civil 
procedure of Romano-Germanic systems, it is commonly said that 
English law developed a procedural system that places a greater em-
phasis on oral evidence. Indeed, witnesses are considered “the prin-
ciple items of judicial evidence,”42 while documentary evidence is 
relegated to second place, in one of the last chapters of the law 
books, as a subject of the lowest importance.  
An explanation is required. Documents are obviously allowed in 
court. If a private document is produced, including in the form of a 
deed, it does not provide conclusive proof of the date, origin, and 
content unless supported by testimonial evidence.43 
                                                                                                             
 42. See C. TAPPER, CROSS & TAPPER ON EVIDENCE 37 (12th ed., Oxford U. 
Press 2010); Walter H. Rechberger, The Principles of Oral and Written Presenta-
tion, in DIMENSIONS OF EVIDENCE IN EUROPEAN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 4, 
at 71 (underlining that the evidentiary effect of any document is linked to the legal 
provisions that requires the oral or the written form of proceedings). For many 
years, after the Norman conquest, written proof and in particular, the deed, pre-
vailed in court over oral testimony: for historical reconstruction and references 
taken from Bracton, Glanville, and the Year Books, see J. Salmond, The Superi-
ority of Written Evidence, 6 LAW Q. REV. 75, 81 (1890). It must however be ob-
served that the prevalence of written documents reduced with the gradual trans-
formation of the jury: a group of individuals informed of the facts of the case that 
become a collegiate judge and who, as a group, are informed of the evidence 
through the process. Such evidence is primarily presented orally.  
 The close connection between the structure of the common law process, which 
on the one hand sees juries and non-bureaucratic judges come together, and oral 
characteristics on the other, bringing with it a concentration of the case in one 
public moment and a refusal of written evidence, to be produced along a pro-
longed evidentiary phase, is underlined by DAMASKA, supra note 20, which high-
lights that in common law systems the pre-trial phase is assuming increasing im-
portance and in some places of the United States, it is possible to waive the hear-
ing of the case. See also D. Bolzanas & E. Tamošiūnienė, Witness Testimony, in 
DIMENSIONS OF EVIDENCE IN EUROPEAN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 4 at 161.  
 43. TAPPER, supra note 42, at 610. Only after the witness to the document 
provides testimony that the document is proof, the concerned party is considered 
to have provided prima facie evidence, that is, “to mean prima facie proof of an 
issue, the burden of proving which is upon the party giving that evidence. In the 
absence of further evidence from the other side, the prima facie proof becomes 
conclusive proof and the party giving it discharges his onus.” See Ex parte The 
Minister of Justice: In re Rex v. Jacobson & Levy [1931] AD 466 at 478.  
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Thus, witnesses to a document’s signing must acknowledge the 
signing of the document in question.44 The unfit nature of a docu-
ment to provide standalone evidence in court without a compliant 
witness also applied to documents authenticated by public notaries. 
Notarial authentication on documents “renders them evidence in for-
eign courts, though certainly not in our Courts of Common Law.”45 
This rule is extremely old. In 1603, it had already been decided that 
a witness was required for the signing, sealing, and delivery of a 
deed. It was insufficient to provide a copy of the document, even if 
drafted by a notary.46 
More recently, that precedent was restated in Chesmer v. Noyes 
in 181547: a notarial protest against a foreign check, made by a no-
tary from Bristol, was produced in court. Lord Ellenborough de-
cided that proof of a missing payment had not been provided as “the 
presentment of a foreign bill in England must be proved in the same 
manner as if it were an inland bill,” thus calling the notary as a wit-
ness.  
In 1870, the Privy Council in Nye v. Macdonald48 decided on a 
distinct matter: the plaintiff was based in Lower Canada (presently 
Quebec) a civil law jurisdiction. To claim land he produced evi-
dence of his right which, among other things, included a power of 
                                                                                                             
 44. The importance of testimonial proof is thus understood; relative to a deed, 
the recent Law of Property Act 1989 holds this importance at its foundations, as 
it required the presence of witnesses at the drafting phase. On this subject, see M. 
CAPPELLETTI, PROCÉDURE ORALE ET PROCÉDURE ÉCRITE 18 (Giuffré 1971). Cap-
peletti observes that the preference for oral proof in English law finds justification 
not only in history: this preference is founded also on the essential principles of 
the process, which require the author of the documents to appear in court to testify 
and be cross-examined by the litigants, and on the acceptance of the hearsay rule, 
which leads to the inadmissibility of a document, which in itself expresses the 
thoughts and beliefs of its author, absent from the trial.  
 45. As stated by Lord Tenterden in King v. Scriveners’ Co, supra note 10.  
 46. See SIR G. CARY, REPORTS OR CAUSES OF CHANCERY 44 (William 
Lambert ed., Sweet 1820) and 21 E.R. 17, which reports the decision of the court: 
“therefore non allowance to be given of a deed, without producing the deed, or 
proving the execution thereof; and here appeareth what want we have of notaries 
and their deputies.” 
 47. Chesmer v. Noyes (1815) 4 Camp. 129; 171 E.R. 42. 
 48. Nye v. Macdonald (1870) 7 Moo. N.S. 134; 17 E.R. 52. 
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attorney, received in the presence of a witness by a notary public of 
Upper Canada (presently Ontario), a common law jurisdiction. Here 
the question of identity was raised, even if ascertained by a notary. 
The plaintiff presented a declaration issued by the government of 
Upper Canada, certifying the appointment and powers of the notary 
and affirming that the notarial act was considered proof of the iden-
tity of those who signed the act. The Canadian court of second in-
stance did not consider the notarial act to be proof. The Privy Coun-
cil approved the decision, stating that the notary public of Upper 
Canada could not be equated with a French notary; that the court, 
even if in territory governed by French law, could not attribute the 
same probative effect to an act of a notary public as is granted to 
public French acts; and that the application of the English rule was 
correct, requiring the testimony of the notary.49 Therefore, “accord-
ing to the law of England, the mere production of a certificate of a 
notary public stating that a deed had been executed before him 
would not in any way dispense with the proper evidence of the exe-
cution of the deed.”  
The rule described above is subject to an exception: where it is 
not possible to call the notary to witness in court. This applies to two 
situations. The first situation relates to acts by notaries who have 
died before the case. A leading case is Sutton v. Gregory from 
1797,50 wherein a check issued in Boston was presented for payment 
in London, on the request of an endorsee of the check. The check 
was rejected (with notification of the rejection). The clerk died be-
fore the case. The rejection was produced in court and was proved 
by witness that a clerk of the notary, with the mandate to follow the 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. at 58; the Privy Council did not apply the lex fori (the civil law of 
Lower Canada) to the issue of evidence, but rather, the English law in force in the 
place of the pre-establishment of the proof: “A Notary public in the province of 
Upper Canada, a province regulated by English Law, has no power, by English 
law, to certify to the execution of a deed in such a way as to make his certificate 
evidence, without more, that the deed was executed . . . .”  
 50. Sutton v. Gregory (1797) Peake Add. Cas. 150; 170 E.R. 226. 
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case, presented the check and recorded the act in the protest register. 
The proof was allowed because the clerk in question was deceased.  
This rule was approved in Poole v. Dicas in 1835.51 A notary 
received a check; he sent one of his clerks to the debtor and the clerk 
took note of the protest in the appropriate register. The employee 
died during the case. The protest register and the signature of the 
register by the clerk were produced as proof. The Court held that 
this counted as sufficient proof, deciding that in the case of the death 
of the author of said signature, the production of the notarial act con-
stitutes sufficient proof.  
The second situation relates to notarial acts created overseas. In 
the 1802 Hutcheon v. Mannington,52 the court discussed an act re-
ceived from a notary public of the Prince of Wales Island in the East 
Indies, held by the Indies Company. Again, a foreign bill protest 
from a foreign notary was held to provide full proof, as was held by 
Lord Ellenborough in Chesmer v. Noyes.53  
It is interesting to note that this second situation is justified in 
the English system by an international public law rule. English 
courts give a foreign document the same evidentiary proof attributed 
to it in the law of the place where it was formed. The court does not 
apply the rule given by the lex fori: “a Notary Public by the Law of 
Nations has credit everywhere: the Court therefore will give credit 
to him.”54 The idea, according to which the common law judge must 
recognize the same evidentiary effect that is in place in the legal 
system where it was drafted, is very old in English law. Written in 
Law French, the 1624 report at the end of Hurd v. Foy clearly stated 
                                                                                                             
 51. Poole v. Dicas (1835) 1 Bing N.C. 649; 131 E.R. 1267. A similar prece-
dent, concerning an act involving a deceased lawyer, may be found in Doe d. 
Patteshall v. Turford (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 890; 110 E.R. 327. 
 52. Hutcheon v. Mannington (1802) 6 Ves. Jun. 823; 31 E.R. 1327 
 53. Chesmer v. Noyes (1815) 4 Camp. 129; 171 E.R. 42: “the protest may be 
sufficient to prove a presentment which took place in a foreign country.” 
 54. Hutcheon v. Mannington (1802) 6 Ves. Jun. 823; 31 E.R. 1327. 
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the following: “sur trial de chose beyond sea, le testimony d’un pub-
lick notary la est bon proof & Ley Chief Justice dit; que tiel proof 
que ils beyond sea voilont allow nous allowomus.”55 
Returning to general documentary proof, there are two circum-
stances in which the document on its own is sufficient proof. In the 
first circumstance, official documents, issued by the public admin-
istration (not by a common law notary), are considered. The acqui-
sition of a conforming copy of a document, drafted by a public au-
thority, is sufficient proof of the date, the origin, and the content of 
the document. The public document provides prima facie evidence 
for the decision of the case, which can be overcome with evidence 
to the contrary.56  
Additionally, private agreements, even twenty years after draft-
ing,57 are preserved by various simple assumptions as long as they 
have been conserved correctly. Testimonial evidence could become 
impossible for the corroboration of the writing. Consequently, in the 
leading case of Wynne v. Tyrwhitt,58 it was stated that the documents 
“coming from the proper custody are admissible in evidence, with-
out proving the hand-writing” of their authors. Therefore, it is pre-
sumed that the date of the document is as stated, that the alterations 
to a deed inter vivos have been made prior to formalisation, and that 
the deed has been sealed in a valid mode (since 1989). 
Finally, today English judges can receive a notarial act “in evi-
dence without further proof.”59 This rule can be rightly considered 
an example of the impact of European continental solutions of civil 
                                                                                                             
 55. Hurd v. Foy (1624) 2 Rolle 346; E.R. 843. 
 56. See TAPPER, supra note 42, at 607; this reminds us that the various frag-
mented legislative provisions of acts of the public administration, combined with 
the Evidence Act of 1845, s. 1 and the Evidence Act of 1851, s. 14, propose the 
presumption that a copy of an act of the public administration conforms with the 
original, on the basis of a declaration of the authority in question. 
 57. The twenty-year term is a result of the Evidence Act of 1938, s. 4; the 
common law precedent imposed thirty years. See TAPPER, supra note 42, at 614. 
 58. Wynne v. Tyrwhitt (1821) 4 B. & Ald. 376; 106 E.R. 975. 
 59. CPR 2005, 32.20. 
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procedural law.60 These last two rules are very important because 
they weaken the conflict between common law and civil law models 
on the evidentiary effect of written acts. 
IV. COMPARING TWO MODELS ON CHALLENGING THE WRITTEN 
EVIDENCE 
In all of the legal systems examined, when a solemn document 
is produced in court—public document, deed, or notarial act—the 
evidentiary effect of such a document can be challenged.  
Two models can be identified to this end. The first model returns 
to the discussion of the evidentiary effect of a solemn document dur-
ing the evidentiary phase of court proceedings. The affected party 
can thus demonstrate the falsity of the alleged document, both when 
involuntarily and voluntarily caused by the author. The classical ex-
ample is when the notary describes in his act a fact that did not hap-
pen, or declares a date or a place different from the true date or 
place.61 The evidentiary effect of the document and the contrary el-
ements thus contribute to judicial discretion. 
This model is welcomed in English law, in which every eviden-
tiary element is presented in court, including those documents, 
which aim to challenge the documents produced by the other party.62 
                                                                                                             
 60. In general, on the Europeanization of English procedural law, see Sladic 
& Uzelac, supra note 20, at 110.  
 61. This research does not consider the different case of forgery, when a doc-
ument is materially created as a false document. 
 62. Numerous sentences deal with the problem of falsity of written evidence 
and acts under seal, that have been verified by witness testimony, especially in 
criminal proceedings; see The King v. Sponsorby (1784) 1 Leach 333, 168 E.R. 
269; Leach v. Buchanan (1802) 4 Esp. 226, 170 E.R. 700; Rex v. Backler (1831) 
5 Car & P. 118; 172 E.R. 902; Rex v. King (1832) 5 Car & P. 123; 172 E.R. 905; 
Rex v. Hurley (1843) 2; M & Rob. 473; 174 E.R. 179 (in all cases, it is affirmed 
that the falsification of a signature on a cheque can be proven by witness and 
presumptions); Boursot v. Savage [1866] L.R. 2 Eq. 134 (falsity of a deed for the 
concession of a leasehold); Cooper v. Vesey [1881] L.R. 20 C.A. 611 (falsity of 
deed containing a warranty on property); Barton v. North Staffordshire Rail. Com-
pany [1888] L.R. 38 Ch. 458 (falsity of a document pertaining to the transfer of 
shares). In re De Leeuw [1922] L.R. 2 ch. 540 (falsity of a deed for the concession 
of a warranty on a property, proven with witnesses); Fung Kai Sun v. Chan Fui 
Hing [1951] L.R. A.C. 489 (similar to the previous case).   
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The recently enacted rule on the evidence of the notarial acts follows 
this solution: “A notarial act or instrument may be received in evi-
dence without further proof . . . unless the contrary is proved.”63 
This model can also be found in § 415 Abs. 2 ZPO, which allows 
evidence to the contrary to contest a notarial act in courts: “Evidence 
proving that the transaction has been improperly recorded is admis-
sible.” In Germany, as stated in § 445 ZPO, evidence to the contrary 
can be reached through the usual methods of proof, with the sole 
exception of interrogation of the parties.64  
Likewise, in Scottish law, it is possible to demonstrate the falsity 
of an authentic document according to the usual rules.65 It must be 
emphasised that this model is perfectly compatible with the stated 
privileged evidentiary effect recognised to notarial acts. In Ger-
many, § 415 ZPO provides the public act with the power of full 
proof, relative to the provision of documental facts by its author (ex-
trinsic). However, a specific court procedure has not been imposed 
                                                                                                             
 63. CPR 2005, 32.20. 
 64. Berger, supra note 22, at 780 et seq.; Ahrens, supra note 22, at 649 et 
seq.; Schreiber, supra note 23, at 208. For relevant cases, see RG, Dec. 12, 1912, 
in RGZ, 81, 95 et seq. (a public will, endowed with evidentiary effect, as per §415 
ZPO, was drafted on 27 September 1909. The will erroneously bore the incorrect 
date of September 25, 1909, but from other elements of the document and from 
the inspection of the repertoire of the attesting notary, it was possible to deduce 
the correct date, which was subsequently accepted by the courts. See also RGZ, 
Dec. 16, 1910, supra note 22, for a similar difference between the dates displayed 
a public will (Mar. 24, 1904) and the actual date (Mar. 24, 1905); RG, Jun. 7, 
1905 in RGZ, 61, 95, in which it was proved by witness that a Auflassung (the 
document for the transfer of real property, to be carried out in front of a notary or 
at the court of the land registers, as per § 925 BGB) was drafted and read to the 
parties by an aide to the competent officer of the land registers office, who assisted 
with the relative operations and signed the document (the court confirmed the 
validity of the document); RG Feb. 5, 1931 in RGZ, 131, 284 et seq., which allows 
for the proving of an error in the date of the annotation of the land register, wit-
nessed by the force of full proof under §418 ZPO, and determined as sufficient 
proof the testimony of an employee of the office of land registers. 
 65. See WALKER, supra note 28, at 94, which places a rather heavy burden 
on the provision of evidence to the contrary drawn from a “probative document”: 
on the proof of forgery, see J. DALRYMPLE, VISCOUNT STAIR, THE INSTITUTIONS 
OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 990 (2d ed. 1693); McDouall, supra note 28, at 94; 
Erskine, supra note 41.  
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for disputing its precision. It is like this that Scottish authentic doc-
uments constitute full proof, save for demonstrations of falsity, 
without particular procedural burden.  
The second model provides for the separation of the case in 
which the document is produced and a special procedure to contest 
the accuracy of the document. This model is utilised in France, Que-
bec, Belgium, and Italy, where the alleged falsity is received and the 
evidence derived from the public document maintains the nature of 
legal proof unless the false nature of the document is proved by spe-
cial procedure.  
The difference between the two models is found first in the struc-
ture of the civil process. In this example, an independent procedure 
is established to deal with the issue of falsity. Alongside this first 
characteristic there is a deeper difference, relative to the quality of 
the contrary evidence, requested to challenge the evidentiary effect 
of a public document. The establishment of a special procedure does 
not actually say anything about the difficulty in providing evidence 
to the contrary. The examination of the French model must thus take 
into account both the structure of the false incidental procedures and 
the type of proof that is requested. 
VII. THE ACTION FOR FALSITY OF A NOTARIAL ACT 
From the d’Aguesseau Grand Ordinance of 1737 and onwards, 
the French procedure to challenge the evidentiary effect of notarial 
acts has maintained its fundamental characteristics.  
The action for falsity is a standalone declaratory action which 
initiates an autonomous process with the aim of ascertaining the true 
nature (real or false) of the declarations issued by the notary and, if 
falsity is found, to eliminate the contested document, indirectly ex-
cluding it as proof in the case. The action can be presented in both 
criminal and civil proceedings.66 
                                                                                                             
 66. The French rule on the action for falsity in contemporary civil procedure 
is clearly illustrated by G. COUCHEZ & X. LAGARDE, PROCÉDURE CIVILE 357 (17th 
ed., Sirey 2014). For the application in the rule for the Belgian law, see M. 
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Originally, the procedure established with the action could re-
quire the judge to give at least three different decisions, unless there 
were other incidents in the proceedings to which the judge objected. 
The timeframe was divided into several stages. In the first stage, the 
plaintiff proposed the lawsuit and the court decided whether to admit 
or reject it.67 The second the lawsuit was accepted, the process began 
in the court to verify the disputed document and later in the hearing, 
to decide upon the admission of the evidence. Finally, in the third 
stage, the evidence was considered and a judgement handed down 
on its basis.68  
The Italian Code of Civil Procedure and the French Nouveau 
Code de Procédure Civile have in part simplified the procedure for 
an action for falsity, streamlining the various steps. The intent is that 
the action leads to a typical evidentiary proceeding. The only differ-
ence between it and the normal examination of evidence is that the 
judge performs no specific formalities or conditions.  
This model, requiring an autonomous procedure to challenge the 
evidentiary effect of the document, obviously presents the problem 
of the relationship between the procedure on falsity and the principal 
case. The civil procedure rules can leave the two actions (the one 
based on the notarial act and the other claiming its falsity) proceed 
independently or suspend the principal case (the one based on the 
                                                                                                             
BOURGEOIS ET AL., LA PREUVE ET LE FAUX 60 (Anthemis 2017); See also for gen-
eral remarks J. Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure, 34 AM. J. 
COMP. LAW 459 (1986).  
 67. In this particularly solemn introductory phase, the plaintiff must deter-
mine if the other party is requesting to use the challenged document; the request-
ing party, in person or with power of attorney, must respond, and if they intend to 
use the document, the plaintiff must declare to cancel the proposal for the action; 
the defendant must then present the document; the sentence that accepts the action 
nominates the presiding judge. 
 68. On legal suits that are underway, see POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS OR 
CONTRACTS, supra note 5, at 372; and for French Law, which follows the pre-
coded phase as illustrated by Pothier, see E. Garsonnet, Trattato teorico e pratico 
di procedura civile, 2 GIUR. IT. 760 (1912); at the time, the Italian Code of Civil 
Procedure of 1865 was tending towards the French model. See the extensive 
comments of L. BORSARI, 4 IL CODICE ITALIANO DI PROCEDURA CIVILE 5 et seq. 
(2d ed. 1888); F.-S. GARGIULO, 2 IL CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE DEL REGNO 
D’ITALIA 381 et seq. (2d ed., Marghieri 1887).  
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notarial act) until a judgment is given on the falsity of the document 
itself. 
In the past, the solution to the problem was understood to be the 
prioritisation of the full faith in the notarial act. The original text of 
article 13 of French Notarial Law repeated the rules of ius commune, 
as accepted by Pothier, which acknowledged the full effect of the 
act until a judgment definitively declares the falsity of the document: 
“les actes des notaires publics seront exécutoires dans tout le roy-
aume, nonobstant l’inscription de faux, jusqu’à jugement dé-
finitif.”69  
Later, article 1319 of the Code Napoleon stated that the judge 
could suspend the enforcement of the act during the procedure on 
falsity.70 After the recent reform of contract law in France, the new 
article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that in case of falsity action, 
the court may suspend the performance of the act: “En cas d’inscrip-
tion de faux, le juge peut suspendre l’exécution de l’acte.”71 The 
same solution appears in article 1317(2) of the Italian Civil Code. 
Incidentally, the falsity action in Italy and France after the 1975 re-
                                                                                                             
 69. See Pothier, Traité des obligations, supra note 5, at 368; to protect the 
creditor who is relying on a public document, he shares the solution that “jusqu’à 
ce que l’accusation de faux ait été jugés tels, ils font foi par provision; et le Juge 
doit ordonner l’exécution provisoire de ce qu’ils renferment.” 
 70. On the effect of the public document during the process of the action for 
forgery, see TOULLIER, supra note 26, at 248; DURANTON, supra note 37, at 274; 
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & BARDE, supra note 37, at 433; DE PAGE, supra note 
37, at 754.  
 71. See Report to the President of the Republic relating to the Feb.10, 2016 
ordinance n° 2016-131 on the reform of contract law, general regime, and proof 
of obligations, Subsection 2: The Authentic Instrument, https://perma.cc/GYG6-
UYAL: 
L’article 1371 reformule en le clarifiant l’actuel article 1319 : les énon-
ciations relatives à des faits que l’officier public a constatés par lui-
même et dont il a pu vérifier l’exactitude, font foi jusqu’à inscription de 
faux. A contrario, celles relatives à des faits qu’il n’a pas constatés par 
lui-même, et non évoquées par le texte, ne font par conséquent foi que 
jusqu’à preuve contraire. L’alinéa 2 propose un texte adapté aux évolu-
tions de la procédure d’inscription de faux (qui lorsqu’elle est engagée 
à titre principal, n’exige plus une saisine préalable du juge pénal) et 
laisse le juge apprécier l’opportunité de suspendre l’exécution de l’acte 
authentique. 
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form gave life to a procedure that suspends the treatment of the prin-
ciple case, as the document in question is considered indispensable, 
but consents to the referral to the judge for the combined decision 
on the falsity and the principle case. The complete division of the 
two models illustrated is thus not absolute. 
Indeed, French and Italian judges have always been able to de-
termine the falsity of a notarial act, avoiding to open a case on it 
where the falsity is detected ictu oculi. In France this solution was 
already adopted by the Cour de Cassation before the codes were 
enacted.72 Following this, the rule was written in article 214 of the 
old French Code of Civil Procedure, in force from 1807 to 2007, 
which allowed the judge to adopt the action “s’il y échet,” allowing 
the judge to exert discretion in the allowance or rejection of a docu-
ment as false.73 Similar rule is now given by article 307 of the new 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
Additionally, it is understood that the judge has the power to 
eliminate the difference between two conflicting documents, both 
constituting legal proof, when the falsity of one of them is readily 
ascertainable. The same model also applies in Quebec.74  
VIII. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CASES OF FALSITY 
French and Italian scholars underline the extreme difficulty in 
bringing forth an action for falsity. For example, De Page, from Bel-
gium, identifies the action for falsity: “est la seule preuve contraire 
                                                                                                             
 72. See for example Cass., 14 floréal an X, S. Jur., 1802.1.603. 
 73. The solution was adopted in Cass., Aug. 18, 1813, S. Jur., IV.1.432 and 
followed, among others, by Cass., Jan. 12, 1833, S. Jur., 18734.1.798; Cass., Mar. 
25, 1835, S. Jur., 1835.1.510; Cass., Aug. 23, 1836, S. Jur., 36.1.740; See also 
Garsonnet, supra note 68, at 758; DURANTON, supra note 37, at 279; 
LAROMBIÈRE, supra note 19, at 279; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & BARDE, supra 
note 37, at 430; DE PAGE, supra note 37, at 753. The solution is also adopted in 
article 308 of the French Civil Code of Procedure, which states the following: “Il 
appartient au juge d’admettre ou rejeter l’acte litigeux au vu des éléments dont il 
dispose.” 
 74. Arts. 258-260, Quebec Code of Civil Procedure.  
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admise contre les mentions protégés par l'authenticité.”75 Thus, it 
could be assumed that the necessary proof for demonstrating the fal-
sity of a notarial act is particularly rigorous, and that the law pre-
cisely determines the means of evidence that are admissible. Various 
legislative provisions appear to be very strict: the plaintiff, when de-
positing the complaint to the courts, must specifically indicate “the 
motives” for the action and the clear proofs of the falsity.76  
In reality, the much-proclaimed difficulty vanishes quickly, as 
the contestation of the truthfulness of the notarial act can be sus-
tained with the usual methods of proof, also in systems that allow 
for the action for falsity.77 Thus, in each of the legal systems ana-
lysed, the obligation to overcome the evidentiary effect of a notarial 
act is substantially identical. Reading the relevant decisions con-
firms this.  
Single pieces of evidence should thus be considered. The inspec-
tion of the document in question is obviously the first piece of evi-
dence that should be referred to. It is, as already shown, sufficient in 
cases where the falsity is discovered by a judge ictu oculi.78  
Testimonial evidence, in systems where the complaint of forgery 
exists, is easily permitted, without limit on the value, debating over 
                                                                                                             
 75. DE PAGE, supra note 37, at 753; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & BARDE, su-
pra note 37, at 430 (advising the reader of how complicated and dangerous a com-
plaint is).  
 76. See art. 306 para. 2, French Civil Code of Procedure. For the Italian rule, 
see Cass., pen., sez. I, Feb. 6, 2017, n. 5494. 
 77. As per G. De Stefano, Falso (incidente di), in XVI ENCICLOPEDIA DEL 
DIRITTO (1967) and C.A. Catania, Jun. 22, 1957, Rep. Foro it., 1958, Falso Civile, 
n. 3. This solution is prevalent in systems based on the French model: for France 
and Belgium, see DE PAGE, supra note 37, at 745; for Québec, see ROYER, supra 
note 37; KÉLADA, supra note 36, at 55; Houle c. Lussier (1976) C.S. 7, which 
allowed for the witness.  
 78. It is also doubtful whether is it necessary to bring forth an action for fal-
sity, in the event of a discrepancy in the relative documentation, when the issue is 
a simple material writing error: in Italy, see Cass., Jan. 30, 1968, n. 294, Rep. Foro 
it, Falso civile, n. 11; Cass., Nov. 25, 1982, n. 6375, Rep. Foro it., Falso civile, n. 
4. More recently, see Cass. Civ., sez. II, May 28, 2007, n. 12399. 
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the verification of the facts.79 Thus, the almost indisputable eviden-
tiary effect of the notarial act begins to crumble. A problem which 
has long worried older French and Italian scholars, for which a pos-
itive solution has been found, concerns the admissibility of the evi-
dence of so-called instrumental witnesses, who were present in the 
drafting of the notarial act.80 The notary himself may be heard as 
witness in the falsity claim.81 
Technical expertise constitutes another important proof in the 
action for falsity.82 Documents of comparison can also be consid-
ered documents not recognised by the parties, notwithstanding the 
limits set for the process of verification of private documents.83 
Presumptions are likewise held to be valid methods of proof, 
which can be offered by the plaintiff in the action for falsity.84 
                                                                                                             
 79. POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS, supra note 5, at 378: “on fait 
entendre tous les témoins qui peuvent avoir connaissance de la fabrication, alté-
ration, et en général, de toute la fausseté des pièces accusées de faux, ou des faits 
qui peuvent servir à en établir la preuve.” See also Garsonnet, supra note 68, at 
774; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & BARDE, supra note 37, at 431; LAROMBIÈRE, 
supra note 19. For Italy, see GARGIULO, supra note 68, at 381 et seq.; M. 
ZANZUCCHI, 2 DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE, DEL PROCESSO DI COGNIZIONE 
88 (5th ed., Giuffrè 1962). For cases, see Cass. Turin, Apr. 6, 1872, Giur. it., 1872, 
277 (Public will: witnesses were called upon to testify that the testator was unable 
to express himself and had not made his intentions clear to the notary. The Court 
overturned the decision of the appeal, which refused this evidence); and Cass. 
Turin, Feb. 13, 1883, Giur. it., 1883, 353, 356 (forged holographic will based on 
expertise and presumptions). 
 80. The positive solution was found in the French Cass., Mar. 12, 1838, S. 
Jur. 1838.1.296; it can also be found in Garsonnet, supra note 68, at 774 note 4; 
BORSARI, supra note 68, at 412 et seq.; GARGIULO, supra note 68, at 429. 
 81. Garsonnet, supra note 68, at 774 note 4; Cass. Turin, Apr. 10, 1885, Giur. 
it., 1885, 396. 
 82. POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS, supra note 5, at 378; Garsonnet, 
supra note 68, at 774; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & BARDE, supra note 37, at 431; 
LAROMBIÈRE, supra note 19; GARGIULO, supra note 68, at 433 et seq.; BORSARI, 
supra note 68, at 414 et seq.; COUCHEZ & LAGARDE, supra note 66, at 358. How-
ever, the French Cour de cassation recently decided that the technical expertise 
cannot be used outside the special procedure for falsity. See Cass., Jun. 11, 2003, 
D. 2003, 1808. Therefore, the judge cannot, during the trial, accept the expertise 
and set aside the notarial act, and the parties must initiate the procedure for falsity. 
 83. See C.A. Milan, Dec. 21, 1965, Foro Pad., 1966, I, 922 et seq.; C.A. Flor-
ence, Jul. 29, 1957, Giur. Tosc., 1957, 479; Cass., Jun. 7, 1977, n. 2333, Rep. Foro 
it., 1977, Falso Civile, n. 5. 
 84. See LAROMBIÈRE, supra note 19, at 534; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & 
BARDE, supra note 37, at 432; For Italy, see De Stefano, supra note 77, at 713; F. 
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It is thus clear that the favourable aspect of the evidentiary effect 
bestowed upon a notarial act almost disappears in reality with the 
use of contrary presumptions. The only remarkable feature of this 
model is found in the autonomy of the proceedings for falsity.  
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
The notarial act has its origins in France and is strictly connected 
to the evidentiary requirements established by the Roman-Canonical 
civil procedure introduced with the reforms of Louis IX. Notaries 
were established in 1254 for creating written proof (i.e., the notarial 
act) for contracting parties. At the early stages of the French civil 
procedure, their function was to offer a qualified witness to the judge 
on the information (promises, facts, transfer of rights) that was held 
in the notarial act. Following this, as the civil procedure developed, 
the production of a notarial document became sufficient.  
This original important feature still appears in Germany. For ex-
ample, § 437 Abs. 2, ZPO provides that “[s]hould the court have 
doubts as to the authenticity of a record or document, it may also 
demand ex officio that the public authority or the person alleged to 
have executed the record or document make a statement regarding 
its authenticity.” Whenever there is doubt surrounding the eviden-
tiary effect relative to the so-called extrinsic nature of a public doc-
ument, the judge may allow the notary to testify.85  
As mentioned in the previous pages, historical evolution sug-
gests that the public document and the Latin notary represent two 
parts of a strong legal institution. In reality, however, the apparent 
stability of the notary profession hides a serious decline: the first 
                                                                                                             
Carnelutti, Prove del falso documentale di provenienza, 2 RIV. DIR. PROC. CIV. 47 
(1936). 
 85. See Berger, supra note 22, at 843 et seq., which emphasises that the no-
tary may be heard by the judge; Ahrens, supra note 22, at 756 et seq.  
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centuries of notarial practice contributed to the creation of institu-
tions and contractual forms that were destined for greatness.86 Fol-
lowing this, notarial activities were concentrated on the drafting of 
wills and property contracts. That said, since real estate wealth has 
lost the central and dominant role in favour of movables and finan-
cial instruments, the notary has remained largely detached from the 
most innovative areas of the law.  
In this evolutionary process, the usefulness of the notarial act 
can be seen initially at the procedural level. The presentation in court 
of a notarial act avoids time wasting and the risk of an unfavorable 
outcome, which can originate from the disregard of a private docu-
ment.87  
Thus, the differences between the two models can be recon-
structed and verified. The first model, mainly adopted in common 
law systems, is characterised by oral evidence, to which the notions 
of the absence of legal proof and a subject are correlated, charged 
with the production of procedurally privileged documents. In these 
systems the notarial function is adopted normally to produce docu-
ments, destined for use in other systems.  
                                                                                                             
 86. See M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (UC Press 1978). Such is the 
thesis of Max Weber in “Economy and Society,” which merits mention:  
the notaries were the only remaining group in Italy by whom the tradi-
tions of a developed commercial law could be perpetuated and trans-
formed. They were, for a long time, the specific and dominant class of 
legal experts . . . . the notaries were one of the most decisive strata in the 
development of the law in general, and until the emergence of the class 
of legally trained judges in Italy . . . . Their own traditions, their long-
lasting connection with the imperial courts, the necessity of quickly hav-
ing on hand a rational law to meet the needs of the rapidly growing re-
quirements of trade, and the social power of the great universities caused 
the Italian notaries to receive Roman law as the very law of commerce, 
especially since, in contrast to England, no corporate or fee interests were 
standing in the way.  
The Weberian position is confirmed by M. RHEINSTEIN, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE 
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 171 (2d ed., Tübingen 1987). Among the innovations 
brought forth through notarial practice exists the notable clause of saisine-
dissaisine inserted in sales, of particular importance in French common law: see 
H. COING, 1 EUROPӒISCHES PRIVATRECHT: ÄLTERES GEMEINES RECHT (1500 BIS 
1800) 451 (Beck 1985). 
 87. The structural connection between the written procedure, legal proof, 
public document and notary is hinted at in CAPPELLETTI, supra note 44, at 18-19. 
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The second model, found in systems that have received the writ-
ten Roman-Canonical procedure, is characterised by the existence 
of documents equipped with evidentiary effect. A person qualified 
to do so prepares this type of document: for historical reasons, nor-
mally this is a Latin notary, but it could also be considered the task 
of a public notary, such as in Baden Württemberg, or a lawyer acting 
as notary, as in other German law countries and in Scotland. 
Through this brief comparative analysis, it is now clear that the 
distinction between the common law and civil law is increasingly 
disappearing on the significance of notarial acts. The evidentiary 
value of notarial acts is an interesting case for the convergence of 
these legal systems.88 
If it is true that, on one side, the attributed evidentiary effect in 
English law is bestowed upon the writings held in proper custody; 
on the other side, in Latin systems, it is possible to contest the evi-
dentiary effect of the notarial document by any means, including an 
action for falsity (when deemed necessary). These two methods lead 
to a marked weakening concerning the difference between the two 
models. 
Many civil procedure scholars think that future evolution will 
show an increasing orality in the proceedings in European continen-
tal systems. Therefore, a decrease in the evidentiary strength of the 
notarial act and a progressive disappearance of the traditional oppo-
sition of the evidentiary rules between civil law and common law 
systems is conceivable.  
 
                                                                                                             
 88. See T. Keresteš & J. Caramelo Gomes, Common Core After All?, in 
DIMENSIONS OF EVIDENCE IN EUROPEAN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 4, at 324.  
 
